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CONSIDERATIONS UNDER THE FEDERAL
BANKING AND SECURITIES LAWS WITH




Successful mergers, consolidations, and tender-offers involving
financial institutions require compliance with a complicated matrix of
state and federal law, including corporate, securities, and banking
regulations. Among the more important variables to be considered are:
whether the institutions involved have state or federal charters;
whether the vehicle utilized in the tender-offer or reorganization is a
holding company; whether any of the institutions has a class of equity
securities registered under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and whether the corporate entities involved
have the same principal place of business or state of incorporation. In
addition, the philosophies, regulations, and policies (published and
unpublished) of the different regulatory agencies must be ascertained
and taken into account. While this article will discuss transactions in-
volving both state and national banks, it will concentrate on the legal
requirements for transactions involving national banks and their
parent bank holding companies.
I. The Regulatory Framework
The banking industry in the United States is composed of a dual
system of national banks, chartered and examined by the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency,' and state banks, chartered and
regulated by agencies established pursuant to state law.2 Since the
*B.A., 1970, Hendrix College; J.D., 1973, Arkansas. Assistant Director, Securities and
Corporate Practices Division, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.
**B.A., 1976, Bates College; J.D., 1979, Catholic University; L.L.M., 1983, Georgetown.
Associated with Updike, Kelly & Spellacy, P.C., Hartford, Conn. Formerly Attorney-Advisor,
Securities and Corporate Practices Division and Enforcement and Compliance Division, Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency.
This article represents the views of the authors only and is in no way intended to reflect the
official position of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.-Ed.
1. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 21-215b (1982).
2. Although the dual system has been praised for encouraging flexibility and innovation, it
also has been condemned for promoting competition among agencies with the result that regula-
tions are inadequately enforced. See J. WHITE, BANKING LAW 45 (1976); Golembe, Our
Remarkable Banking System, 53 VA. L. REv. 1091, 1101 (1967).
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passage of the National Bank Act of 1864,1 Congress has fostered a
policy of competitive equality between national and state chartered
banks. National banks are required to operate within the provisions of
state law, except to the extent that such laws are inconsistent with
federal law.4
One commentator has noted, "Since the depression federal supervi-
sion of banks has bordered on bureaucratic overkill." ' National banks
are regulated by the Federal Reserve Board6 and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC),7 in addition to the Office of the Comp-
troller of the Currency. Similarly, state chartered banks, although pri-
marily regulated by the various state banking authorities, are allowed
to apply for membership in the Federal Reserve System8 and for FDIC
insurance.9 Thus, few banks avoid federal supervision entirely.'0
Although Congress has recognized that more than one agency may
be an "appropriate federal banking agency" and thereby exercise
supervisory authority over a given institution," it has generally
provided for a "responsible agency" to exercise primary regulatory
authority.2 Under the Bank Merger Act,'3 the Comptroller of the
Currency is the responsible agency if the "acquiring, assuming or
resulting" bank is to be a national bank or a bank operating under the
laws of the District of Columbia (national banks); the responsible
agency for state member banks is the Board of Governors of the
3. Ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). See 12
U.S.C. § 38 (1982).
4. See, e.g., National State Bank v. Long, 630 F.2d 981 (3d Cir. 1980).
5. WHITE, supra note 2, at 45. See also Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de La Cuesta,
102 S.Ct. 3014, 3018 (1982) (the authority of federal bank regulatory agencies over financial in-
stitutions extends from "cradle to ... corporate grave"), quoting People v. Coast Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 316 (S.D. Cal. 1951). One justification for such extensive regula-
tion is the special relationship banks have with the public. Banks are frequently regarded as
quasi-public institutions, despite the fact that they are organized and operated by individuals in
anticipation of profit, because of their profound impact on the economy and individual financial
interests.
6. National banks are required to be members of the Federal Reserve System. 12 U.S.C.
§ 222 (1982).
7. All national banks are required to be insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. 12
U.S.C. § 1814 (1982).
8. 12 U.S.C. §§ 321-22 (1982).
9. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1815-16 (1982).
10. By the end of 1973, only 207 banks were neither Federal Reserve System members nor in-
sured by the FDIC. WHITE, supra note 2, at 45.
11. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(q) (1982).
12. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(2) (1982). See also 12, U.S.C. § 1813(q) (1982) and 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78c(a)(34), 781(i) (1982).
13. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1982).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol36/iss4/3
BANK MERGERS OR TAKEOVERS
Federal Reserve System; and the responsible agency for nonmember
insured banks is the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.'"
Because banks are relatively free to convert from state to national
charters and vice versa,'" it is possible for a bank to select the
regulatory authority that will have primary, if not exclusive, authority
to rule upon its various applications, including applications for
branches, operating subsidiaries, mergers, takeovers, and other
changes in ownership. Because the various bank regulatory agencies
sometimes have different and contradictory philosophies as to certain
types of market- or product-extending activities, the choice of regula-
tor determines the activities in which a bank may participate.'"
II. The Bank Holding Company Act
A substantial number of banks have chosen to adopt a bank holding
company form of operation. A "bank holding company" is defined as
"any company which has control over any bank or over any company
that is or becomes a bank holding company .... " For purposes of
the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA),'" a "bank" is defined as
any institution that both accepts deposits the depositor has a legal
right to withdraw on demand and which engages in the business of
making commercial loans.'9 Similarly, "company" is defined to in-
clude "any corporation, partnership, business trust, association, or
similar organization, or any other trust."20 Excluded from the defini-
tion, however, are corporations "the majority of the shares of which
are owned by the United States or by any State."'" Neither an in-
14. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(2) (1982).
15. 12 U.S.C. §§ 35, 214a (1982). See also 12 C.F.R. § 5.24 (1983). The policy statement
contained in that regulation provides that the Comptroller
ordinarily will approve an application by a state bank or other financial institution
for conversion to a national bank when such approval is consistent with the basic
objective of maintaining a sound national banking system. An application to con-
vert should not be motivated solely by supervisory pressures from other regulatory
authorities.
12 C.F.R. § 5.24(a)(2) (1983) (emphasis added).
16. Compare, e.g., Comptroller's regulations at 12 C.F.R. §§ 5.30-.31, 5.33-.34 (1983) with
FDIC regulations at 12 C.F.R. § 333.1-.101 (1983).
17. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a) (1982).
18. Ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (1956) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (1982)).
19. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1982).
20. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(b) (1982). Such "other trust" is not a "company" if, by its terms, the
trust must terminate within twenty-five years or not later than twenty-one years and ten months
after the death of individuals living on the effective date of the trust. Id.
21. Id.
1983]
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dividual nor individuals acting in concert are a company for purposes
of the BHCA.22
The key factor in determining whether a bank holding company ex-
ists under the BHCA is the concept of "control." 23 A company is
deemed to have control over a bank or over any company if: (1) the
company directly or indirectly or acting through one or more other
persons owns, controls, or has power to vote 25% or more of any class
of voting securities of the bank or company; (2) the company controls
in any manner the election of the majority of the directors or trustees
of the bank or company; or (3) the Federal Reserve Board (Board)
determines after notice and opportunity for hearing that the company
directly or indirectly exercises a controlling influence over the manage-
ment or policies of the bank or company.24 Any company that directly
or indirectly owns, controls, or has power to vote less than 5% of any
class of voting securities of a given bank or company is presumed not
to control that bank or company.25 Similarly, in administrative or
judicial proceedings,26 a company may not be held to have had control
over any given bank or company unless that company at the time in
question directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or had power to vote
5% or more of any class of voting securities of the bank or company, or
had already been found to have had control in a Board proceeding.27
Under the ownership attribution rules, shares owned or controlled
by any subsidiary of a bank holding company, or held or controlled
directly or indirectly by trustees for the benefit of a company, the
shareholders or the members of a company, or the employees of a
company, are deemed to be controlled by such a company. Similarly,
shares transferred by a bank holding company directly or indirectly to
any transferee who is indebted to the holding company or which has
one or more officers, directors, trustees, or beneficiaries in common
with or subject to control by the transferring holding company are
deemed to be indirectly owned or controlled by the bank holding com-
pany, unless the Board determines that the transferor is not in fact
capable of controlling the transferee.28
To assist in the determination of "control," the Board has adopted
22. See P. HELLER, FEDERAL BANK HOLDING COMPANY LAW 3 (1976).
23. "Control" is defined in 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a), (g) (1982); 12 C.F.R. § 225.2 (1983).
24. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2) (1982).
25. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(3) (1982). See infra note 45.
26. Other than a hearing to determine whether a company directly or indirectly exercises con-
trolling influence over the management or policies of the bank or company. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 1841(a)(2)(C) (1982).
27. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(4) (1982).
28. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(g) (1982).
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certain conclusive presumptions by regulation. Whenever the transfer-
ability of 25% or more of any class of voting securities of a company
is conditioned in any manner upon the transfer of 25% or more of any
class of voting securities of another company, the holders of both se-
curities affected by the condition constitute, in their capacity as such,
a "company" for purposes of the Act.29 The regulation also sets forth
five rebuttable presumptions of control and establishes a procedure
for determining control in any case where there is a rebuttable pre-
sumption, or in any case where it appears to the Board that a company
is exercising a controlling influence over the management or policies of
a bank or another company and the company has not complied with
the provisions of the BHCA.3 ' In such cases, the Board may inform
the company that a preliminary determination of control has been
made and that the company has thirty days in which to:
(1) indicate its willingness to terminate the control relationship; or
(2) indicate that it will promptly seek Board approval to retain the
control relationship; or
(3) indicate that it will register as a bank holding company; or
(4) if it is already a holding company, report the bank or other com-
pany as a subsidiary; or
(5) provide the Board with such facts and circumstances as may sup-
port its contention that there is not a control relationship. A company
may request a hearing to contest the Board's preliminary determina-
tion of control".
3
Bank holding company status subjects the holding company, its sub-
sidiary banks, and its nonbank subsidiaries to additional regulation.
For example, subsidiaries of bank holding companies may be affiliates
of the other subsidiary banks in the holding company for purposes of
the loan limitations to affiliates.3 Moreover, the permissible activities
of bank holding companies and their subsidiaries are regulated by both
state and federal law. States may not permit bank holding companies
to expand or engage in activities that would violate the BHCA, but
states may restrict the permissible activities of bank holding companies
within their jurisdictions.3 '
On the federal level, bank holding companies are required to file a
29. 12 C.F.R. § 225.2(a) (1983). The presumption does not apply if one of the issuers of such
securities is a properly identified subsidiary of the other.
30. 12 C.F.R. § 225.2(b) (1983).
31. 12 C.F.R. § 225.2(c) (1983).
32. Id.
33. 12 U.S.C. §§ 221a, 371c, 1828(j).
34. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 35, 36, 85 (1982).
19831
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registration statement with the Federal Reserve Board within 180 days
of becoming a holding company." The Board is authorized to require
bank holding companies to submit reports under oath,36 and by regu-
lation bank holding companies are required to file annual reports up-
dating their registration information.3 7 The Board may also examine
each bank holding company and its subsidiaries.38 In addition, a bank
holding company may be subject to Securities Act and Exchange Act
registration and filing and disclosure requirements.9
The BHCA prohibits any company from acquiring control of a
bank without the prior approval of the Board.4 It is also unlawful for
any action to be taken that causes any company to become a bank
holding company or that causes a bank to become a subsidiary of a
bank holding company without such prior approval. Prior approval is
also necessary before a bank holding company or a nonbank sub-
sidiary thereof may acquire all or substantially all of the assets of a
bank, or before any bank holding company may merge or consolidate
with any other bank holding company.4
By statute, the Board, after receiving an application from a com-
pany seeking to become a bank holding company or seeking to do any
of the activities enumerated in 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a), must give notice to
either the Comptroller of the Currency or the appropriate state super-
visory agency."2 If the Comptroller of the Currency or the state bank
supervisory agency disapproves the application, the Board must so
notify the applicant and further inform both the applicant and the
disapproving agency of the hearing date.3 The hearing must com-
mence not less than ten nor more than thirty days after the notice; if
35. 12 U.S.C. § 1844(a) (1982).
36. 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c) (1982).
37. 12 C.F.R. § 225.5(b) (1983).
38. 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c) (1982); 12 C.F.R. § 225.5(b) (1983).
39. See infra note 157.
40. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a) (1982).
41. Id. There are certain exceptions enumerated in the statute.
42. Notice is required, according to the statute, "[fln order to provide for the submission of
the views and recommendations of the Comptroller of the Currency or the State supervisory
authority, as the case may be." 12 U.S.C. § 1842(b) (1982). Such views must be submitted within
thirty days, or within ten days in the event that an emergency condition requires expeditious ac-
tions. The statute also provides the Board with the authority to dispense with notice re-
quirements if the Board determines "that it must act immediately on any application for ap-
proval under this section in order to prevent the probable failure of a bank or bank holding
company involved in a proposed acquisition, merger, or consolidation transaction . . . ." Id.
43. Id. No hearing is required if the state bank supervisory agency or Comptroller recom-
mends approval. See, e.g., Northwest Bancorp. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 303
F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1962).
[Vol. 36:789
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the Board fails to act on any application for approval within ninety-
one days, the application is deemed to have been granted."
The BHCA sets forth specific factors the Board must consider in
reviewing applications for the formation of a bank holding company
or any acquisition, merger, or consolidation pursuant to 12 U.S.C. §
1842. Specifically, the Board will not approve:
(1) any acquisition or merger or consolidation.., which would
result in a monopoly, or which would be in furtherance of
any combination or conspiracy to monopolize or to attempt
to monopolize the business of banking in any part of the
United States; or
(2) any other proposed acquisition or merger or consolidation...
whose effect in any section of the country may be substan-
tially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly,
or which in any other manner would be in restraint o[f]
trade, unless it finds that the anticompetitive effects of the
proposed transaction are clearly outweighed in the public in-
terest by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting
the convenience and needs of the community to be served.5
The legal standard the Board applies in reviewing applications pur-
suant to BHCA is the same as federal bank supervisory agencies apply
in reviewing proposed merger transactions." First, the Board must
consider the anticompetitive effect of the proposed transaction as set
forth in 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c). The standards are derived from, but not
identical to, the Sherman Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act.47 If
the Board determines a proposed activity would violate the antitrust
standards, it must deny the application unless the anticompetitive ef-
fects are clearly outweighed by the needs of the community to be served.
Approval of a transaction by the Board does not free the transaction
44. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(b) (1982).
45. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1982). It is important to remember that any company may ac-
quire up to 5% of the voting shares of a bank, and maybe even as much as 24.99%, without
becoming a bank holding company, so long as the acquiring company avoids other indicia of
control. See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a), (g) (1982); 12 C.F.R. § 225.2 (1983). Although persons seeking
to form a bank holding company must obtain approval from the Board, the authority to ap-
prove the formation of certain bank holding companies has been delegated to the Federal
Reserve Banks. 12 C.F.R. § 265.2(0(22) (1983). If a proposed formation of a bank holding com-
pany involves the acquisition of two or more banks, applicants have a choice of filing either con-
solidated or separate applications. However, when the proposal to acquire several banks is con-
tained in a single application, the Board may deny the entire proposal if it believes that the
approval of even one of the acquisitions is unjustified. See Southland Bank Corp., 60 FED.
RESERvE BULL. 669 (1974). "If the applicant files for one bank at a time, the applicant may be
more successful in obtaining the bank most sought after." HELLER, supra note 22, at 84.
46. Compare 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1982) with 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5) (1982).
47. United States v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86 (1975).
1983]
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from litigation on antitrust grounds. The Board is required to notify
the Attorney General immediately of its approval of a proposed ac-
quisition, merger, or consolidation transaction under 12 U.S.C. §
1842.48
A transaction may be consummated immediately on approval by the
Board if the Board has found that "it must act immediately in order to
prevent the probable failure of a bank or bank holding company in-
volved in any such transaction."' 49 Similarly, if the Board has advised
either the Comptroller of the Currency or the state supervisory
authority "of the existence of an emergency requiring expeditious ac-
tion and has required the submission of views and recommendations
within ten days," the transaction may be consummated within five
days of Board approval.' The statute specifically provides, however,
"In all other cases, the transaction may not be consummated before
the thirtieth calendar day after the date of approval by the Board."'"
The statute further provides:
Any action brought under the antitrust laws arising out of an ac-
quisition, merger, or consolidation transaction approved under
section 1842 of this title shall be commenced prior to the earliest
time under this subsection at which the transaction approval
under section 1842 of this title might be consummated. The com-
mencement of such an action shall stay the effectiveness of the
Board's approval unless the court shall otherwise specifically
order. 2
It is therefore possible in transactions involving bank holding com-
panies that three federal agencies will have an opportunity to express
their policies with regard to both anticompetitive effects and whether
such effects are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the prob-
able effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of
the community to be served.3 In assessing the anticompetitive effects





53. The Federal Reserve Board issued a Proposed Policy Statement on Bank Acquisitions,
Feb. 26, 1982. That statement was criticized by the Justice Department as allowing some applica-
tions "to escape careful Board scrutiny." Am. BANKER, Apr. 20, 1982, at 1. The Board had
previously argued that it had the authority to deny a proposed transaction based on findings that
the anticompetitive effects would thwart the convenience and needs of the community, even if
these effects are insufficient to constitute a violation of the antitrust standards. However, this
view has been rejected by several circuits. See Mercantile Texas Corp. v. Board of Governors,
638 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1981); Washington Mut. Say. Bank v. FDIC, 482 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.
1973) (concerning the language in the Bank Merger Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5) (1982)). It should
be noted that despite the "commerce" language in section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 18 (1982), and the historical distinction between banking and commerce, the Supreme Court
[Vol. 36:789
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of any particular transaction, competition from the thrift industry has
not historically been considered. The Supreme Court, in United States
v. Connecticut National Bank,5" stated:
[D]espite the strides that savings banks in that State have made
toward parity with commercial banks, the latter continue to be
able to provide a cluster of services that the former cannot, par-
ticularly with regard to commercial customers, and this Court has
repeatedly held that it is the unique cluster of services provided by
commercial banks that sets them apart for purposes of [the anti-
trust laws].
With the passage of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act of 1980,11 however, the historical distinctions
between thrifts and commercial banks, at least as to the locally limited
retail customer, has been virtually eliminated.
In addition to the anticompetitive effects, the Board is required to
evaluate the so-called "banking factors."56 As discussed by the
Supreme Court in Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
v. First Lincolnwood Corp":
The Board has regularly treated deficiencies in the financial and
managerial resources of holding companies and their banking sub-
sidiaries as sufficient grounds for denying an application.
Moreover, Congress has been made aware of this practice, yet
has expressly held that bank mergers are subject to the Clayton Act. United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
54. 418 U.S. 656, 664 (1974).
55. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980). Thrifts are increasingly viewed as competitors in
gauging the anticompetitive impact on market share. United States v. First Nat'l State Bancor-
poration, 499 F. Supp. 793, 800 (D.N.J. 1980). The reluctance of the Board to include most non-
bank competition in its definition of product market has led to extensive criticism. See Note,
Commercial Bank Mergers: The Case for Procedural and Substantive Deregulation, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 1914, 1919 (1982):
[I]n delineating the market in which to assess the competitive impact of bank
mergers, the Board, by failing to include most nonbank competition, has produced
an unrealistically narrow definition of the product market. The resulting inflation
of concentration ratios renders the guidelines more stringent for bank mergers than
for mergers in other industries.
See also Savage, The Line of Commerce: Does it Apply to Thrift Institutions?, IssUES IN BANK
REGULATION 31 (Autumn 1982).
56. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1982). "In every case, the Board shall take into consideration the
financial and managerial resources and future prospects of the company or companies and the
banks concerned, and the convenience and needs of the community to be served." Id. Pursuant
to the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2905 (1982), federal financial
supervisory agencies are required to "assess the institution's record of meeting the credit needs
of its entire community, including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, consistent with the
safe and sound operation of such institutions, and . . . take such record into account in its
evaluation "of applications involving merger transactions. 12 U.S.C. § 2903 (1982). See 12
U.S.C. § 2902(3)(E) (1982).
57. 439 U.S. 234 (1978).
19831
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four times has "revisited the Act and left the practice untouched."
We therefore agree with the Court of Appeals that the Board can
disapprove formation of a bank holding company solely on
grounds of financial or managerial unsoundness."
The choice of charter, Federal Reserve System membership, and FDIC
insurance, as well as use of bank holding companies, has led at least
one observer to conclude:
The inability of the agencies to dispose uniformly of merger ap-
plications further undercuts claims of agency expertise. A bank
can choose its regulator through its decision to organize as a na-
tional or as a state bank, with or without membership in the
Federal Reserve System. A bank can thus select the agency that
promulgates regulatory policies, including merger approval policy,
most favorable to the transactions desired by the bank. This op-
portunity to choose produces a "race of laxity" as agencies deny
increasingly fewer bank proposals in order to retain banks within
their jurisdiction."
III. Banking Law Considerations
The supervisory framework for regulating mergers and takeovers of
banks is subject to the criticism that under the current regulatory
framework, bank mergers receive duplicative, inconsistent, and inef-
ficient treatment from the agencies and from the courts.6" In addition
to the issues raised by the structure of federal bank regulation in the
United States and its effect on mergers and acquisitions, the substan-
tative laws under which banks, bank holding companies, and their
nonbank subsidiaries must operate present additional considerations
that may have an impact on both geographic and product-market ex-
tensions, as well as on the ability of individuals and entities to control
the financial institutions.
A bank's choice to operate pursuant to a state or a national charter,
as well as the choice (in the case of a state bank) to become a member
of the Federal Reserve system can affect the scope of the permissible
activities of that bank and any of its subsidiaries. Furthermore, the
choice to conduct activities through a bank, bank subsidiary, or a non-
bank subsidiary of a bank holding company can affect not only the
58. Id. at 248, quoting in part Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 74 (1974). The Court further
held that "the Board may deny applications for holding-company status solely on grounds of
financial or managerial unsoundness, regardless of whether that unsoundness would be caused
or exacerbated by the proposed transaction." Id. at 252.
59. Note, Commercial Bank Mergers: The Case for Procedural and Substantive Deregula-
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range of permissible activities available to the institution but can also
influence the ability of the institution to expand its geographical
markets.
The range of permissible activities for state chartered banks is
regulated primarily by their respective state laws. The powers of na-
tional banks are set forth in 12 U.S.C. § 24.6 That statute grants cer-
tain express powers and further authorizes banks to exercise "subject
to law, all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the
business of banking .... ",62 The seminal case interpreting this
language is First National Bank v. National Exchange Bank.63 There,
the Supreme Court interpreted section 24(7) as granting such powers
as are required to meet all the legitimate demands of the author-
ized business, and to enable a bank to conduct its affairs, within
the general scope of its charter, safely and prudently. This
necessarily implies the right of a bank to incur liabilities in the
regular course of its business, as well as to become the creditor of
others. Its own obligations must be met, and debts due to it col-
lected or secured. The power to adopt reasonable and appropriate
measures for these purposes is an incident to the power to incur
the liability or become the creditor.64
In interpreting these incidental powers, one commentator has stated
that:
First, the function cannot be specifically prohibited by law.
Secondly and possibly most important today, is the concept of
safety. The courts will not sanction a speculative business activity
which threatens the security of the bank. Thirdly, the activity
must be reasonable or appropriate. Although the measure of
reasonableness is nowhere explicitly stated, the cases suggest that
reasonableness should be measured by customary practices of
other financial institutions or nonfinancial institutions, or even by
the frequency with which other banks are following the ques-
tioned practice.65
It should be noted, however, that the activities of nonbank sub-
sidiaries of bank holding companies are permissible if they are found
to be "so closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks
as to be a proper incident thereto."66 In determining whether a par-
ticular activity is a proper incident to banking, the Board considers
61. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1982).
62. 12 U.S.C. § 24, J 7 (1982).
63. 92 U.S. 122 (1875).
64. Id. at 127.
65. WHITE, supra note 2, at 308.
66. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982).
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whether the activity to be performed by the affiliate of a holding com-
pany can reasonably be expected to produce benefits to the public,
such as greater convenience, increased competition, or gains in ef-
ficiency, that outweigh possible adverse effects, such as undue concen-
tration of resources, decreased or unfair competition, conflicts of in-
terest, or unsound banking practices. In orders and regulations under
this subsection, the Board may differentiate between activities com-
menced de novo and activities commenced by acquisition, in whole or
in part, of a going concern."7
The scope of permissible activities for nonbank subsidiaries of bank
holding companies is further defined in 12 C.F.R. § 225.4.68 That
regulation sets forth a "laundry list" of activities that have been found
to be permissible. It further sets forth procedures for filing applica-
tions to engage in nonbanking activities both through de novo entry69
and through acquisitions of going concerns.70 That an activity is on the
list, however, does not mean prior Board approval is not required for
the acquisition of shares of the company engaged in the activity, nor
does it mean a holding company is free to engage in the list of non-
banking activities without approval for the formation of a newly
organized company. If a proposed activity is listed in 12 C.F.R. §
225.4 and the bank holding company is planning to engage in such ac-
tivity through a de novo operation and no substantive adverse com-
ments have been received, the Board will consider the application in
light of the "public benefits" test set forth in 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8).72
Historically, the-scope of the "closely related" language of the
BHCA was believed to allow nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding
companies to engage in a broader range of activities than would be
permissible for banks or for the subsidiaries of banks pursuant to the
incidental powers clause of the Glass-Steagall Act.72 Thus, regulatory
67. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(8) (1982).
68. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4 (1983).
69. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(b)(1) (1983).
70. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(b)(2) (1983).
71. That subsection provides:
In determining whether a particular activity is a proper incident to banking or
managing or controlling banks the Board shall consider whether its performance
by an affiliate of a holding company can reasonably be expected to produce
benefits to the public, such as greater convenience, increased competition, or gains
in efficiency, that outweigh possible adverse effects, such as undue concentration
of resources, decreased or unfair competition, conflicts of interests, or unsound
banking practices. In orders and regulations under this subsection, the Board may
differentiate between activities commenced de novo and activities commenced by
the acquisition, in whole or in part, of a going concern.
12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982).
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choices such as charter, membership in the Federal Reserve system,
and the proposed corporate structure for the contemplated activity can
greatly affect the scope of permissible activities. This is especially evi-
dent with regard to the increase in bank activities in the securities area.
The securities activities of national banks are greatly limited by sec-
tion 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act," which limits
[t]he business of dealing in securities and stock by [an] associa-
tion.., to purchasing and selling such securities and stock without
recourse, solely upon the order, and for the account of, customers,
and in no case for its own account, and the association shall not
underwrite any issue of securities or stock [subject to certain ex-
ceptions] .... 1
Similarly, section 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act prohibits any entity "in
the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing . . . se-
curities, to engage at the same time to any extent whatever in the
business of receiving deposits.""5 By its terms, section 21 does not pro-
hibit an entity that is receiving deposits from affiliating with an entity
that is underwriting, selling, or distributing securities for its own ac-
count.7 6 Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act" prohibits affiliations be-
tween member banks that are members of the Federal Reserve system
and firms that are "engaged principally" in certain specified securities
activities. Thus, state banks that choose not to be members of the
Federal Reserve system are arguably far freer from the restrictions im-
posed by the Glass-Steagall Act. A contention is frequently raised that
savings and loan associations are not "banks" within the meaning of
the Glass-Steagall Act and are therefore not subject to the wall it at-
tempts to create between commercial and investment banking.
78
72. Ch. 89, § 16, 48 Stat. 162, 184 (1935) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 24, 7 (1982).
While this is generally true, it is no longer universally the case. The Comptroller approvedfutures
commission merchant and discount brokerage activities for national banks before the Federal
Reserve Board approved such activities for bank holding companies and their nonbank sub-
sidiaries. BANKING EXPANSION REP., Feb. 21, 1983, at 6. See, e.g., Application of Security
Pacific Nat'l Bank, [1982-1983] FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 99,284, at 86,255 (Aug. 26,
1982); Application of Bank America Corp. to acquire Charles Schwab & Co., [1982-1983] FED.
BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 99,475, at 86,631 (Jan. 7, 1983).
73. Ch. 89, § 16, 48 Stat. 162, 184 (1935) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 24, 7 (1982).
74. Id. Section 5(c) of the Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1982), extends these same
provisions to state banks that have become members of the Federal Reserve System. However,
these provisions do not apply to state chartered banks that are not members of the Federal
Reserve System.
75. 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(1) (1982).
76. See H.S. Scott, What Should be Done About the Glass Steagall Act, 6 (preliminary
draft, Nov. 1, 1981).
77. 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1982).
78. Scott, supra note 76, at 6.
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IV. Interstate Mergers and Acquisitions
The decision to structure an activity through a bank, bank holding
company, or a nonbank subsidiary of a bank holding company may
have an effect on the ability of a corporation to operate on an in-
terstate basis. In 1927, Congress passed the McFadden Act, 9 xhich
was intended to establish competitive equality between national banks
and state banks that were members of the Federal Reserve system by
allowing national banks to branch within their municipalities to the ex-
tent permitted by state branching laws.8 0 Furthermore, the Glass-
Steagall Act permits national banks to branch on a statewide basis to
the extent that state law permits such branching."
Historically, however, state statutes almost universally prohibited
out-of-state banks from establishing branches; thus the McFadden Act
operated as a bar to most interstate banking. Similarly, the BHCA pro-
hibits interstate bank holding company acquisitions of a "bank"
unless that acquisition is explicitly permitted by the statute of the
state.2 In recent months, however, those prohibitions have come
under increasing attack.3
By its terms, the BHCA only prohibits bank holding companies
79. Ch. 191, 44 Stat. 1224 (1933) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
80. Ch. 191, § 7, 44 Stat. 1224, 1228 (1933) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1982)). The
McFadden Act is said to be an outgrowth of A.P. Giannini's (Bank of America's founder) ambi-
tion to branch nationwide. He attempted to buy the predecessor of Citibank and his designs on
the New York market led to a "celebrated" meeting with J.P. Morgan at which an agreement
was reached that was described as "New York for J.P., the West for A.P." Wall St. J., Apr. 26,
1983, at 4, col. 2.
81. Ch. 89, § 23, 48 Stat. 162, 189 (1935) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1976)). Despite the
congressional goal to foster competitive equality, it must be noted that state banking authorities
and the Comptroller of the Currency have not always agreed on either their interpretation of the
state banking laws with regard to branching or with regard to the method by which a bank will
be allowed to branch. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252
(1966).
82. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982).
83. Some have criticized these statutory restrictions as fostering disparity between the powers
of foreign and domestic banks because foreign banks were allowed to establish offices in more
than one state. See, e.g., Halbrook & Savage, Interstate Commercial Banking; the Anti-Trust
Issues, 98 BANKING L.J. 747, 748 (1981). The International Banking Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-369, 92 Stat. 607 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), "attempted to equalize the
competition between U.S. and foreign banks mainly by restricting interstate expansion by
foreign banks rather than increasing the expansion powers of domestic banks." Id. Further, sec-
.tions 112 and 121 of the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No.
97-320, 96 Stat. 1469-1541 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (1982) permits certain ac-
quisitions of endangered institutions by out-of-state banks or bank holding companies. The law
requires prior consultation with the state bank supervisor and includes a preference for extraor-
dinary acquisitions by in-state rather than out-of-state institutions. These provisions are limited
to closed banks with total assets of at least $500 million and mutual banks of that size that are
either closed or in danger of closing.
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from having "bank" subsidiaries in more than one state (unless
specifically authorized by state law), but does not prohibit bank
holding companies from having nonbank subsidiaries in multiple
states. Therefore, the definition of "bank" becomes crucial for a bank
holding company." A bank holding company may be able to engage
in interstate activity that is functionally similar to the business per-
formed by "banks" through the use of nonbank subsidiaries that are
engaged in permissible nonbanking activities pursuant to 12 U.S.C. §
1843(c)(8). Such activities must be "so closely related to banking or
managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto."8
In this regard, bank holding companies have attempted to charter or
acquire limited-purpose banks that arguably are not "banks" for pur-
poses of the BHCA because they do not both accept demand deposits
and engage in the business of making commercial loans.s6
84. Congress has twice modified the definition of "bank" under the BHC Act. The
original definition included all national banks, state banks, and savings banks. Act
of May 9, 1956, ch. 240, § 2(c), 70 Stat. 133. In 1966, the definition was narrowed
to encompass only those domestic institutions which "[accept] deposits that the
depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand." Act of July 1, 1966, Pub. L.
No. 89-485, § 3, 80 Stat. 236, 237. The current definition was enacted in 1970: "(c)
'Bank' means any institution ... which (1) accepts deposits that the depositor has
a legal right to withdraw on demand, and (2) engages in the business of making
commercial loans." 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1982).
Wilshire Oil Co. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 668 F.2d 732, 733 (3d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1132 (1982).
85. See, e.g., In re Crocker Nat'l Corp., 66 FED. RESERVE BULL. 66 (1979), in which the
Federal Reserve Board allowed the acquisition of an Hawaiian trust company by a California
bank holding company. The Board opined that the trust company would not function as a bank
because such trust company activities are permissible nonbanking activities described in Federal
Reserve Board Reg. Y, 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a) (1983).
86. See Wilshire Oil Co. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 668 F.2d 732 (3d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1132 (1982). The Comptroller of the Currency, in 1981, allowed
Household Finance Corporation to acquire a small California bank, which divested its commer-
cial loan portfolio. Following that and several other similar acquisitions, the definition of "com-
mercial loan" was reevaluated by the Board. The Board now considers a commercial loan to be
any loan other than a loan the proceeds of which are used to acquire property or services used by
the borrower for personal, family, household, or charitable purposes. This definition of com-
mercial loan is very broad and includes the purchase of such instruments as commercial paper,
bankers' acceptances and certificates of deposit, the extension of broker call loans, the sale of
federal funds, the deposit of interest-bearing funds, and similar lending vehicles. Letter from
William W. Wiles, Secretary of the Federal Reserve Board, to Joseph Diamond, Esq., Dec. 16,
1982, regarding the proposed acquisition by the Dreyfus Corporation, New York, N.Y., of Lin-
coln State Bank, East Orange, N.J.
The Board also has strictly construed the term "demand deposit." The Wilshire Oil Com-
pany of Texas was unable to keep its New Jersey banking subsidiary even though it changed its
official policy to restrict withdrawals from demand deposits to fourteen-day requests. Wilshire
Oil Co., 668 F.2d at 734. (Wilshire also informed bank customers that it would continue to
honor demand withdrawals. Id.) The court, in sustaining the Board's order of divestiture, did
not rely on the Board's reasoning that Wilshire had granted depositiors a continuing legal right
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During 1982 the Comptroller of the Currency allowed ten nonbank-
ing companies to obtain national bank charters for subsidiaries. In
each case, the companies claimed the subsidiaries technically were not
"banks" within the meaning of the BHCA because they did not offer
both demand deposit accounts and commercial loans.8 7 The Comp-
troller of the Currency, however, has "declared a moratorium for
[much of 1983 and at least part of 1984] in letting nonbanking com-
panies establish banking subsidiaries.""8
There are, of course, additional ways for bank holding companies to
establish an interstate presence. A bank holding company is free to ac-
quire up to 5% of the voting shares of a bank regardless of state
boundaries, and may, so long as it does not exercise some direct or in-
direct control, increase to 24.99% its interest in bank or bank holding
companies located in other states.8 9 Further, bank holding companies
have sought to purchase interest by means other than voting securities,
such as nonvoting preferred stock, thus avoiding incidents of control.90
Such purchase agreements typically provide for conversion into com-
mon stock upon relaxation of the "ban" on interstate banking.9 1
of withdrawal on demand under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Id. at 735. The court,
rather, relied on the legislative history of the BHCA, which evidenced a congressional intention
to cover financial institutions that accept the "functional equivalent" of a demand deposit. Id.
at 738.
87. By offering either demand deposits or commercial loans, but not both, the "nonbank"
banks attempt to avoid the BHCA definition of bank, thus avoiding regulation by the Board.
Wall St. J., Apr. 6, 1983, at 4, col. 1.
88. Id. Before the moratorium, however, a dispute developed between the Comptroller and
the Federal Reserve Board. In February 1983, the Comptroller granted a charter to J. & W.
Seligman & Company to establish a national bank subsidiary in New York. The Federal Reserve
Board warned that Seligman could face fines of $1,000 a day if it proceeded. The Comptroller
then informed Seligman that it should ignore the Federal Reserve Board. "The Comptroller's
decision is entitled to great weight and isn't subject to review by another agency after the fact."
Wall St. J., Apr. 7, 1983, at 3, col. 3.
89. Compare 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (1982) with 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982).
90. See, e.g., letter from William H. Wiles, Secretary of the Federal Reserve Board, to
William R. Hichman, Jr., Executive Vice President, Chase Manhattan Corporation, New York,
N.Y., June 21, 1982, concerning the purchase by Chase Manhattan Corporation, a New York
bank holding company, of $25 million of Equimark Corporation (Pittsburgh, Pa.) nonvoting
Series B preferred stock and $25 million of nonvoting preferred stock of Equimark's subsidiary
bank, Equibank.
91. See generally "Fed Shows Frustration in Latest Investment Guides," Legal Times of
Washington, Aug. 9, 1982, at 34. Because of the proliferation of such "nonvoting" acquisi-
tions, the Federal Reserve Board, on July 8, 1982, issued a Policy Statement seeking to provide
guidance regarding the consistency of such agreements with the BHCA. 47 Fed. Reg. 30,965 (July
16, 1982) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 225.143 (1983)). The Board emphasized that such agreements
could be consistent with the BHCA if indicia of control were not present. The Board observed,
however, that in some agreements it reviewed, the bank holding company had sought to protect
its investment by placing restrictions on the operations of the acquiree bank. The Board was
critical of those arrangements and outlined several steps that should be taken to preclude con-
trol, including: (1) specific convenants allowing incumbent management discretion in operating
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol36/iss4/3
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Finally, various states are amending their banking laws to allow at
least some interstate banking, frequently on a reciprocal basis.92 For
example, Alaska permits out-of-state bank holding companies to ac-
quire in-state banks.93 Delaware permits the establishment of limited-
purpose, wholesale-oriented, single-office banks by out-of-state bank
holding companies.94 Iowa effectively permits certain bank holding
companies to engage in interstate activities.95 Maine permits bank
holding company acquisitions on a reciprocal basis.96 Massachusetts
and Connecticut permit branch banking and bank holding company
acquisitions on a reciprocal basis, but only with other New England
states.97 New York permits bank holding company acquisitions on a
reciprocal basis.98 South Dakota permits limited-purpose banks to be
acquired by out-of-state bank holding companies.99
V. The Change in Bank Control Act
The Change in Bank Control Act of 1978 (CBCA)' 00 prohibits the
acquisition by any person of control of any federally insured bank, in-
cluding a bank holding company, without sixty days' prior written
the business of the bank; (2) a "call" provision allowing the acquiree bank to liquidate the in-
vestment at its option (thus making the transaction more a loan than an equity investment); and,
(3) covenants allowing the acquiree the right of first refusal to purchase any warrants or options
issued in connection with the transaction. 12 C.F.R. § 225.143(d) (1983).
92. Congress is not expected to repeal the McFadden Act because of the political influence of
the nation's 14,500 commercial banks. Relaxations on interstate banking will probably come on
a case-by-case basis. Wall St. J., Apr. 26, 1983, at 4, col. 2.
93. ALASKA STAT. § 06.05.235(e) (1982).
94. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 803 (Supp. 1982).
95. IOWA CODE ANN. § 524.1805 (vest Supp. 1982-83).
96. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B, § 1013 (1980).
97. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 167A, § 2 (West Supp. 1983). For a discussion of the con-
stitutional issues presented by this proposal, see J. HAWE & N. PETERSON, BANK ACQUISITIONS
AND HOLDING COMPANY EXPANSIONS 460-87 (1980); Hawke, Of Legal Bogs and New England
Clam Chowder. A Rejoinder, BANKING EXPANSION REP., Mar. 7, 1983, at 1, 12; Golembe,
Massachusetts and Interstate Banking, BANKING EXPANSION REP., Jan. 17, 1983, at 1, 11.
98. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 142-b (McKinney Supp. 1982-83).
99. S.D. COD. LAWS ANN. § 51-16-40 (1980). See BANKING EXPANSION REP., Jan. 3, 1983, at
5. The state of Tennessee is also considering a relaxation on its prohibition against out-of-state
bank holding company acquisitions but would limit those acquisitions to "troubled" institu-
tions. Pressure is currently being brought because of the agreement in principle executed between
Jake F. Butcher, 93% owner of United American Bank of Chattanooga, Tennessee, and the
First Union Corporation, a North Carolina holding company. The agreement was reached in the
wake of the failure of United American Bank, Knoxville, Tennessee, also owned by Butcher.
Wall St. J., Apr. 6, 1983, at 25, col. 2. Similarly, the state of Washington recently enacted
legislation that would allow out-of-state acquisitions once the state banking commissioner deter-
mined that the Washinton bank is in danger of "closing, failing or insolvency." That legislation
was apparently enacted to allow Bank America Corporation to acquire Seafirst Corporation, a
troubled Washington bank holding company. Bank America Corporation continues to oppose a
reciprocal bill pending in the California legislature.
100. Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3683 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1817 (1982).
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notice to the appropriate federal banking agency.1 1 Before passage of
the CBCA, acquisitions of controlling interest in banks and bank hold-
ing companies by individuals generally were not subject to scrutiny by
federal regulatory agencies. The CBCA changed that by defining a per-
son as an "individual or corporation, partnership trust, association,
joint venture, pool, syndicate, sole proprietorship, unincorporated
organization, or any other form of entity not specifically listed
herein."'12 Through the CBCA, Congress now requires entities at-
tempting to acquire control of a federally insured financial institution
to undergo prior review by a bank supervisory authority.103 At the
same time, Congress recognizes that a traditional application pro-
cedure, such as that provided by the Bank Holding Company Act0 4 or
Bank Merger Act,los might prove unacceptably disruptive to acquisi-
tion plans. Congress has been sensitive to the undesirable implications
of overburdening individual property rights by eliminating the trans-
ferability of bank securities, which could have resulted in an unneces-
sary infringement upon the banking system's ability to raise capital.
0 6
In light of these considerations, the CBCA was carefully tailored to
avoid the creation of needless barriers to the consummation of
legitimate business transactions. Rather than an approval procedure,
the CBCA only granted federal supervisors the authority to "disap-
prove" changes in control. Because of concerns for the property rights
of shareholders of financial institutions, Congress limited ad-
ministrative discretion by merely requiring notice to the supervisory
agency with time constraints on agency action, rather than requiring
the supervising agency to approve an application. Administrative
discretion was further limited by specific statutory standards under
which the agency may disapprove changes in control and by review
procedures.0 7 The CBCA explicitly exempts transactions that are sub-
101. 12 U.S.C. § 18170) (1982).
102. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j)(8)(A) (1982).
103. "Control" is defined in the Act as the "power, directly or indirectly, to direct the
management or policies of an insured bank or to vote 25 per centum or more of any class of
voting securities of an insured bank." 12 U.S.C. § 18170)(8)(B) (1982). The Comptroller, by
regulation, adopted a rebuttable presumption of control at the 10% ownership level if the 10%
owner is, by virtue of the acquisition, the single largest shareholder. 12 C.F.R. § 5.50(h)(3)(i)(B)
(1983). Compare similar regulations adopted by the FDIC and Federal Reserve Board, 12 C.F.R.
§ 303.15(a)(2) (1983) and 12 C.F.R. § 222.7(a)(2) (1983), respectively.
104. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (1982).
105. 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (1982).
106. See REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE CHANGE IN BANK CONTROL ACT OF 1978, OFFICE OF
THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY (Mar. 9, 1981) [hereinafter CBCA REPORT]. A copy of the
CBCA Report can be secured from the Comptroller of the Currency, Communications Division.
107. Id. In certain respects, the Act's procedures are similar to the premerger notification
review procedures of § 201 of the Hart Scott Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub.
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ject to section 3 of the Bank Holding Company Act °8 or section 18 of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act'0 9 because they are covered by ex-
isting regulatory approval procedures."0
Pursuant to the CBCA, a proposed acquisition may proceed if the
appropriate regulatory agency does not, within sixty days, either: (1)
issue a notice disapproving the proposed acquisition, or (2) extend for
up to thirty days the period during which disapproval may be issued. '
The CBCA requires that notices to the agency contain specific per-
sonal and biographical information, detailed five-year financial infor-
mation, a description of the proposed transaction, information of any
structural or managerial changes contemplated, and any other relevant
information required by the agency."'
The CBCA specifies certain bases for disapproval of a proposed ac-
quisition."3 These factors include:
(1) potential anticompetitive factors that are not clearly outweighed
in the public interest by the probable effect of the acquisition in
meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be served; or
(2) the financial condition of the acquiring person is such as might
jeopardize the financial stability of the bank or prejudice the interest
of the depositors of the bank; or
(3) the competence, experience, or integrity of any acquiring person
indicates that it would not be in the interest of the public to permit
such person to control the bank; or
(4) the acquiring person fails to furnish the appropriate federal
banking agency with the requisite information."4
L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1390, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1982). However, before acquisitions governed by
Hart Scott Rodino may be consummated, notification must be filed and a thirty-day waiting
period must expire, affording the Department of Justice the opportunity to determine whether
such acquisitions may, if consummated, violate the antitrust laws.
108. 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1982).
109. 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (1982).
110. See 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j)(16) (1982) For national banks, the Comptroller has promulgated
regulations that provide a separate exception for transactions described in 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841 or
1842 (1982) such as foreclosures by institutional lenders, acquisitions of securities by banks in a
fiduciary capacity, and increases of majority holdings by bank holding companies. While these
transactions do not require prior approval of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
Board pursuant to the Bank Holding Company Act, they are nonetheless exempted because they
are subject to § 3 of the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1982). There are also
regulatory exemptions that apply to acquisitions of additional shares by persons already deemed
to be lawfully controlling national banks. See CBCA REPORT, supra note 106.
111. 12 U.S.C. § 18170)(1) (1982).
112. 12 U.S.C. § 18170)(6) (1982). The appropriate agencies are also specifically authorized to
amend the type of information required in a CBCA notice.
113. 12 U.S.C. § 18176)(7) (1982).
114. Id.
1983]
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In enacting this legislation, Congress was concerned with the con-
tinued stability of financial institutions."I5 "Indeed, one of its primary
purposes was to insure the safety and soundness of the target institu-
tion and the banking industry as a whole.""' 6 The CBCA
was designed to provide information and regulatory review of a
bank acquisition before that acquisition is consummated. Accord-
ingly, the Act must be interpreted to mean that any person who
proposes to embark on a course of conduct which would go on
without interruption and result in the acquisition of control, must
go through the applicable notification and approval process
before beginning that course of conduct."'
In the Mid-Continent case, despite the fact that defendants "never had
the power to vote twenty-five percent of Mid-Continent's common
stock, and there was some doubt as to whether they actually acquired
the power to vote even ten percent of that stock," the court held that
"because defendants were intent on acquiring control. . . they were
therefore obligated to comply with the requirement of the CBCA
before commencing their acquisition. Because they did not, they are in
violation of that act." 18
According to the Comptroller of the Currency, "[d]isapproval of
proposed changes in control have been rare.""19 The Comptroller has
taken a position that tender-offers subject to the Exchange Act may
proceed while a CBCA notice is being processed, provided steps are
taken to assure that the tendering party does not acquire control of the
bank prior to the Comptroller's disposition.20 This requires drafting
115. See Mid-Continent Bancshares, Inc. v. O'Brien, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 98,734, at 93,702 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 11, 1981).
116. Id. Courts are divided on the question of whether target banks and bank holding com-
panies are intended beneficiaries of the CBCA and have standing to seek injunctive relief. Com-
pare Mid-Continent, supra; and First Alabama Bancshares, Inc. v. Lowder, CU 81-M-D325
(N.D. Ala. May 1, 1981) with Quaker City Nat'l Bank v. Hartley, 533 F. Supp. 126 (S.D. Ohio
1981) and Flagship Banks, Inc. v. Smithes, No. 81-713-CIV-SPS (S.D. Fla. July 22, 1981). There
is no express private right of action pursuant to the CBCA.
117. Mid-Continent Bancshares, Inc. v. O'Brien, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 98,734, at 93,709 (E.D. Mo. Dec, 11, 1981).
118. Id. Accord, FDIC v. D'Annunzio, 524 F. Supp. 694, 698 (N.D. W.Va. 1981). The court
stated that the CBCA
requires that under certain circumstances where 25 percent of the outstanding
shares of an insured bank are acquired or intended to be acquired that [the ap-
propriate bank regulatory agency] be given a sixty day notice and that [the ap-
propriate regulatory agency] then can take some action to disapprove the transac-
tion within sixty days with the option of extending consideration for an additional
thirty days.
524 F. Supp. at 698 (emphasis added).
119. CBCA REPORT, supra note 106, at 18.
120. Id. at 2.
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the tender-offer to condition its effectiveness on favorable disposition
by the Comptroller. In such cases, it should be noted that the filing of
a CBCA notice does not start the five-day period for a public an-
nouncement pursuant to the Comptroller's tender-offer rules'2 ' be-
cause the CBCA notice is not publicly filed. '22
It is possible that two competing factions could file notices pursuant
to the CBCA as part of an attempt to gain control of the same na-
tional bank. One would expect that if either party were to have their
notice approved prior to the other, they would have a significant ad-
vantage in acquiring control of the bank. In this regard, the Comp-
troller has stated that the Office "would probably attempt to dispose
of notices simultaneously."'
2 3
In determining when a group has been formed for purposes of a
CBCA, the Comptroller has stated that "while the aggregate security
ownership of the putative group members may exceed the statutory or
regulatory percentage threshold, the CBCA is not triggered at the time
the group is formed unless there has been a disposition of voting rights
to the group by its members."' 2' Finally, the CBCA provides that any
person who willfully violates any provision of the Act or any regula-
tion issued pursuant to the Act may be fined a penalty of not more
than $10,000 per day for each day during which such violation con-
tinues.'s2 At least one court has recognized the right of the appropriate
federal banking agency to seek injunctive relief for violations or poten-
tial violations, regardless of their "willfulness."' 2 16 That court stated:
"The absence of willfulness... is not crucial nor even relevant to the
resolution of this case. Instead, what is important is the power to
control."'2 7 The court further stated that the federal agencies "must
be very careful about how [they go] about enforcing [the Change in
Bank Control Act] and must do it in the most economical manner
121. Compare 12 C.F.R. § 11.5(o) (1983) with 12 C.F.R. § 11.5(1)(4) (1983).
122. 12 C.F.R. § 5.50 (1983).
123. CBCA REPORT, supra note 106, at 8.
124. Id. at 12.
125. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j)(15) (1982). The statute also provides:
The appropriate Federal banking agency shall have the authority to assess such a
civil penalty, after giving notice and an opportunity to the person to submit data,
views, and arguments, and after giving due consideration to the appropriateness of
the penalty with respect to the size of financial resources and good faith of the per-
son charged, the gravity of the violation, and any data, views, and arguments sub-
mitted. The agency may collect such civil penalty by agreement with the person or
by bringing an action in the appropriate United States district court, except that in
any such action, the person against whom the penalty has been assessed shall have
a right to trial de novo.
126. FDIC v. D'Annunzio, 524 F. Supp. 694 (N.D. W. Va. 1981).
127. Id. at 699.
1983]
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possible .... The injunctive process is the most efficacious way to ac-
complish compliance."12
VI. The Bank Merger Act
The Bank Merger Act of 1966129 prohibits "merger transactions" by
FDIC-insured banks without the prior written approval of the respon-
sible agency.30 The responsible agency shall not approve any proposed
merger transaction that would result in a monopoly or that would
substantially lessen competition, unless it finds that the an-
ticompetitive effects of the proposed transactions are clearly out-
weighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the transaction
in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be
served.'3' Just as under the BHCA, the responsible agency is required
in every case to "take into consideration the financial and managerial
resources and future prospects of the existing and proposed institu-
tions, and the convenience and needs of the community to be
served."'3 The Bank Merger Act also provides that the responsible
agency shall immediately notify the Attorney General "of any ap-
proval of a proposed merger transaction."' Generally, such transac-
tions may not be consummated before the thirtieth day after the date
of approval by the agency in order to allow the Department of Justice
time to determine whether to attack the merger transaction on an-
titrust grounds. As with the BHCA, commencement of an antitrust
challenge will stay the effectiveness of the agency's approval unless the
court orders to the contrary.'34 In the event the responsible agency
notifies the Attorney General and the other two banking agencies of
the existence of "an emergency requiring expeditious action," a
merger transaction may be consummated as soon as five days after the
approval by the responsible agency."' Finally, if the responsible
agency has determined that "it must act immediately to prevent the
128. Id. at 700-01.
129. Pub. L. No. 89-356, 80 Stat. 7 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (1982)).
130. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1982). The Bank Merger Act further provides that "unless the
responsible agency finds that it must act immediately in order to prevent the probable failure of
one of the banks involved," notice of the proposed merger shall be published prior to the agen-
cy's approval. The notice period is thirty days, or ten days if "an emergency exists requiring ex-
peditious action." 12 U.S.C. 1828(c)(3), (4) (1982).
131. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5) (1982).
132. Id.
133. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(4) (1982).
134. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(7) (1982).
135. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(6) (1982).
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probable failure of one of the banks involved," the transaction may be
commenced immediately upon approval.'3 6
VII. The National Bank Act
The statutory requirements for mergers and consolidations involving
national banks are governed by 12 U.S.C. §§ 214a, 215, and 215a, de-
pending on whether the transaction involves a merger or a consolida-
tion and whether the surviving or resulting institution is a national or a
state bank.'37 National banks may consolidate with one or more state
or national banks pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 215 upon approval from the
Comptroller, and with majority approval from the board of directors
of each bank and ratification by at least two-thirds of the shareholders
of the outstanding stock of each institution.'38 However, if a state
bank is involved and state law requires ratification by greater than
two-thirds of the shareholders, then the higher state ratification stan-
dard will be required for the state institution.'39
A shareholders' meeting called to consider consolidation may be
held after a notice has been published for at least four consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. However, publication by
notice may be waived by unanimous shareholder approval if the
Comptroller determines that "an emergency exists justifying such
waiver."'" The consolidated association shall be liable for all
liabilities of the respective consolidating banks.'' The shareholders of
any of the banks involved who have voted against such consolidation
or who have provided written notice of dissent from the consolidation
plan, "shall be entitled to receive the value of the shares so held by
them when such consolidation is approved by the Comptroller.... ,"
42
The value of the shares of any dissenting shareholders are appraised as
of the effective date of the consolidation by a committee of three per-
sons. The committee is composed of one person selected by the vote of
the dissenting shareholders, one selected by the directors of the con-
136. Id.
137. Section 214a governs mergers and consolidations in which a state bank is the resulting or
surviving institution. 12 U.S.C. § 214a (1982). Section 215 governs consolidations in which a na-
tional bank survives. 12 U.S.C. § 215 (1982). A "consolidation" refers to a transaction in which
two or more preexisting institutions join together and create a new institution. A "merger"
refers to a transaction in which one of the preexisting institutions survives with the other(s)
disappearing into it.
138. 12 U.S.C. § 215(a) (1982).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. 12 U.S.C. § 215(b) (1982).
142. Id.
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solidated banking association, and one selected by the other two com-
mittee members. A shareholder who objects to the value so fixed by
such appraisal may appeal within five days to the Comptroller, "who
shall cause a reappraisal to be made which shall be final and binding as
to the value of the shares of the appellant."'43 The expenses of such
reappraisal shall be paid by the consolidated banking association.
44
Stock of a consolidated national banking association may be issued as
provided by the terms of the consolidation agreement, free from any




The statutory requirements governing mergers of national banks or
state banks into national banks are set forth in 12 U.S.C. § 215a,
which provides that "[o]ne or more national banking associations or
one or more State banks, with the approval of the Comptroller,.. .may
merge into a national banking association" pursuant to the statute.
46
Merger agreements are required to be approved in writing by a majori-
ty of the board of directors of each association and ratified by an af-
firmative vote of the shareholders owning at least two-thirds of the
capital stock of each bank involved, unless state law requires a higher
standard of ratification in the case of a state bank.'47 The share-
holders' meeting is to take place after notice is published for at least
four consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation and after
each shareholder is notified in writing. As with consolidations, publi-
cation notice may be waived in cases where the Comptroller deter-
mines that an emergency exists justifying such waiver, by unanimous
action of the shareholders of each institution. Merger agreements are
required to specify the total amount of capital stock in the receiving
association, the amount of stock (if any) to be allocated for the trans-
action, and cash (if any) to be paid to shareholders of the merging
associations.'8 Such agreements must also provide that the receiving
association shall be liable for all liabilities of the merging institutions. 1'9
143. 12 U.S.C. § 215(c) (1982). The statute further provides that the shares of the con-
solidated banking association that would have been delivered to such dissenting shareholders,
had they not requested payment, shall be sold by the consolidated banking association at an
advertised public auction, unless some other method of sale is approved by the Comptroller. If
the shares are sold at a price higher than the price paid to the dissenting shareholders, the excess
is to be paid to those shareholders. 12 U.S.C. § 215(d) (1982). See infra note 216 and the accom-
panying text for an analysis of difficulties that arise in holding company acquisitions or
reorganizations because of the operation of the securities laws and the "public auction" require-
ment.
144. 12 U.S.C. § 215(d) (1982).
145. 12 U.S.C. § 215(g) (1982).
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The appraisal rights of dissenting shareholders in such merger transac-
tions are similar to those contained in the consolidation statute. I50 And
as with the consolidation statute, the merger statute provides that
stock of the receiving association may be issued as provided by the
terms of the merger agreement, free from any preemptive rights of the
shareholders of the respective merging banks.'5S
National banks also may convert into, merge with, or consolidate
with a state bank in the same state, so long as the plan has been ap-
proved by a majority of its board of directors and after compliance
with certain notice provisions.'12 The statute does not require any par-
ticular percentage of shareholder ratification.' Dissenting share-
holders are entitled to receive in cash the value of the shares held by
them if the transaction is consummated. 54 The value will be determined
as of the date of the shareholders' meeting by an appraisal committee of
three members who are chosen in a manner similar to the one in which
a committee is chosen when the resulting institution is a national
bank.'5 The statute provides for reappraisal by the Comptroller. How-
ever, when the resulting institution is a state bank, the manner of dis-
persal of the dissenters' shares must merely be provided for in the plan
of conversion, merger, or consolidation. There is no statutory require-
ment for a public auction.'5 6 The National Bank Act further provides
that national banks may merge or consolidate with state banks only if
the state law is no more restrictive than the federal law with regard to
state banks merging, converting, or consolidating into national
banks.
VIII. Federal Securities Law
The applicability of the federal securities laws to financial institution
mergers, consolidations, or tender-offers depends on whether the in-
stitutions are Securities Exchange Act'5 8 registrants'59 and on the type
150. Compare 12 U.S.C. § 215(b), (c), (d) (1982) with 12 U.S.C. 215a(b), (c), (d) (1982). The
appraisal rights of shareholders of state banks that consolidate or merge into national banks are
determined by state law. 12 U.S.C. §§ 215(d), 215a(d) (1982).
151. 12 U.S.C. § 215a(g) (1982).
152. 12 U.S.C. § 214a(a) (1982).
153. Id.
154. 12 U.S.C. § 214a(b) (1982).
155. Id.
156. Compare 12 U.S.C. § 214a(b) (1982) with 12 U.S.C. §§ 215(d), 215a(d) (1982).
157. See 12 U.S.C. § 214c (1982). Merger transactions resulting in national banks may not be
in contravention of the state law. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 215(d), 215a(d) (1982).
158. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C. §§ 77, 78 (1982).
159. Exchange Act § 12(g), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1982). The Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48
Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1982) can also apply, but only in
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of vehicle utilized to effect the transaction. Section 12(i) of the Ex-
change Act 6" contains general provisions pertaining to financial in-
stitutions and primary banking regulators named in that section.
161
Under section 12(i), banking regulators are given the powers, func-
tions, and duties otherwise vested in the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (Commission) to administer and enforce Exchange Act sec-
tions 12,162 13,163 14(a), 16  14(c), 165 14(d),' 66 14(f),167 and 16168 for
securities issued by their regulated entities.' 69 They are authorized to
investigate past and potential violations of the enumerated sections
and to bring actions to enjoin such violations. 70 In addition, the bank-
ing regulators have authority to make such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to implement the Exchange Act provisions for which
they are responsible. However, they are required to issue within sixty
days of adoption by the Commission substantially similar rules and
regulations, "unless they find that implementation of substantially
similar regulations ... are not necessary or appropriate in the public
holding company acquisitions. In addition, there are certain instances, at least as to national
banks, in which institutions not covered by the Exchange Act can be subjected to requirements
similar to those of the Exchange Act. For example, the Comptroller reviews proxy solicitation
materials of national banks not covered by the Exchange Act when those materials are used in
connection with shareholders' meetings called to consider the merger or consolidation of the in-
stitution. The Comptroller considers the quality of disclosure to shareholders as one item in his
determination of whether to approve the proposed transaction. 12 C.F.R. § 5.33(b)(2)(vi) (1983).
The Comptroller's regulations promulgated and adopted under the Exchange Act, 12 C.F.R. §§
11.1 to 11.103 (1983) are enforced by the staff in that determination.
160. 15 U.S.C. § 781(i) (1982).
161. The provisions of Exchange Act § 12(i) apply to: (1) national banks and their primary
regulator, the Comptroller of the Currency; (2) savings and loan institutions and the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB); (3) state chartered member banks of the Federal Reserve
System and the Board of Governors; and, (4) state chartered FDIC-insured nonmember banks,
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
162. 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1982).
163. Id. § 78m (1982).
164. Id. § 78n(a) (1982).
165. Id. § 78n(c) (1982).
166. Id. § 78n(d) (1982).
167. Id. § 78n(f) (1982).
168. Id. § 78p (1982).
169. Absent from the enumerated sections are sections 10(b), id. § 78j(b) (1982), and 14(e), id.
§ 78n(e) (1982), the "antifraud" provisions. Argument can be made that the latter sections are
not jurisdictional and that they may be invoked to enforce the substantive requirements
contained in the enumerated sections. See infra text accompanying notes 202-213.
170. Exchange Act § 21(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a) (1982) and the legislative history of section
12(i), 15 U.S.C. § 781(i) (1982), contained in S. REP. No. 379, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 63-64
(1963). See also 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(n), 1820(c) (1982), for the Comptroller's general powers with
regard to investigations.
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interest or for protection of investors and publish such findings, and
the detailed reasons therefor, in the Federal Register."' 7 '
In order to come within Exchange Act registration requirements, na-
tional banks must have $1 million in assets and five hundred share-
holders,'72 or have a class of securities listed on a national exchange. '"
Such banks would not, however, be subject to the reporting require-
ment imposed by Exchange Act section 15(d)14 for companies having
a registration statement in effect under the Securities Act.'
The national banks subject to Exchange Act registration and to the
Comptroller's regulations adopted under the Act'76 must make
periodic filings similar to those made by other publicly held com-
panies.'77 The filings required are made with the Comptroller rather
than with the Commission. In the event the bank converts to a holding
company structure, it would then deregister with the Comptroller and,
assuming the holding company remained above the asset and share-
holder threshold of section 12 (or rules 12g-1 and 12g), it would
register with the Commission and make the periodic filings with that
171. 15 U.S.C. § 781(i) (1982). As originally enacted in the 1964 Securities Acts amendments,
section 12(i) did not require the adoption of substantially similar regulations. Pub. L. No.
88-467, 78 Stat. 565. That requirement was added as part of the Depository Institutions Amend-
ments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 105(b), 88 Stat. 1503.
172. Effective Apr. 15, 1982, the Commission, pursuant to its general rule-making powers,
adopted rule 12g-1 revising the criteria for companies subject to Exchange Act registration. The
asset value now required is $3 million, up from $1 million. That change was based on Commis-
sion findings that the rate of inflation between 1964, when originally adopted by Congress, and
1982 justified the higher figure as consistant with congressional intent relating to the size of af-
fected companies. The Commission also adopted a companion rule, rule 12g-4, which provides
for deregistration if the number of shareholders drops below five hundred. Previously,
deregistration could occur only if the number of shareholders dropped below three hundred.
Release No. 34-1864, 6 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,204 (Apr. 15, 1982). The Comptroller,
notwithstanding the requirements of section 12(i), has not adopted substantially similar regula-
tions.
173. Exchange Act § 12(b), 15 U.S.C. § 781(b) (1982).
174. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1982).
175. A distinction should be drawn between the bank as a registrant and its holding company
parent. Although bank-issued securities are exempt from Securities Act registration, bank
holding company-issued securities are not. Hence, the holding company, even a "one bank
holding company," having as its sole asset a single bank, could be subject to Securities Act as
well as Exchange Act registration requirements. Securities issued by national banks, while
exempt from Securities Act registration, are subject to the Comptroller's Securities Offering
Disclosure Rules, 12 C.F.R. §§ 16.1-16.8 (1983). Those regulations, adopted pursuant to the
National Bank Act, provide a format for disclosure and require that material information be
disclosed regarding the issuer.
176. There are at present approximately 270 national banks covered by the Exchange Act.
177. The Comptroller's regulations under section 12 were originally adopted in 1964 and,
although amended from time to time, continue in their original format. See 12 C.F.R.
§§ 11.1-11.103 (1983). The last amendments were adopted Jan. 22, 1981 (46 Fed. Reg. 6865).
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agency. The timing and triggering mechanisms of those filings are
substantially the same.
Within 120 days of the close of the fiscal year in which the filing re-
quirement was triggered, national banks covered by the Exchange Act
must file with the Comptroller a registration statement on Form F-1.'78
Thereafter, pursuant to the various enumerated sections, the bank, its
officers, directors, or significant shareholders must make periodic
filings dependent either on time or certain events.
Exchange Act section 13 requires all companies covered by its provi-
sions to file an annual report.'79 National banks subject to that
requirement must file their annual reports with the Comptroller on
Form F-2'8 ° within ninety days of the close of the fiscal year or within
thirty days of the mailing of the bank's annual report to shareholders,
whichever comes first.' 8' Quarterly reports on Form F-4'82 must be
filed no later than forty-five days after the end of the quarterly period
for each fiscal quarter ending after the close of the latest fiscal year for
which a registration statement, Form F-i, was in effect.' 3 A current
report on Form F-3'84 must be filed within fifteen days of the happen-
ing of certain events, including: (1) changes in control of the bank; (2)
acquisition or disposition of assets; (3) bankruptcy or receivership;
(4) changes in the bank's certifying accountant; (5) resignation of the
bank's directors; or (6) other materially important events.'85 The re-
quirements of Comptroller's forms F-i, F-2, F-3, and F-4 correspond
with Commission forms 8-A, 10-K, 8-K, and 10-Q, respectively. In ad-
dition, any person who acquires beneficial ownership of 5% or more
of the outstanding shares of any class of securities issued by a national
bank registered under the Exchange Act must file with the bank and
the Comptroller an Acquisition Statement on Form F-1I within ten
days of that acquisition.' 6
Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act'87 prohibits the solicitation of
proxies without compliance with applicable regulations. The form of
the proxy statement or statement where management does not solicit
proxies is described in 12 C.F.R. § 11.51 and Form F-5. 88
178. 12 C.F.R. §§ 11.4(a), 11.41 (1983).
179. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1982).
180. 12 C.F.R. § 11.42 (1983).
181. 12 C.F.R. § 11.4(e) (1983).
182. 12 C.F.R. § 11.44 (1983).
183. 12 C.F.R. § 11.4(h) (1983).
184. 12 C.F.R. 99 11.43, 11.4(g) (1983).
185. Id.
186. 12 C.F.R. §§ 11.47, 11.4(g)(2) (1983). See also 12 C.F.R. § 11.4(g)(4) (1983), regarding
the definition of "beneficial owner."
187. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982).
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The form for statements in election contests is described in 12
C.F.R. § 11.52."89 Section 14(c) of the Exchange Act provides that if
management does not solicit proxies, it still must "transmit to all
[shareholders of record] information substantially equivalent to the in-
formation which would be required to be transmitted if a solicitation
were made."'90 This section covers situations in which management
controls sufficient votes to accomplish the purpose of the share-
holders' meeting without soliciting proxies. All shareholders, however,
are entitled to receive the information they would have received had
their proxy been solicited. Exchange Act section 14(d)191 would pro-
hibit tender-offers for shares of covered national banks except in com-
pliance with that section and the Comptroller's regulations. ' 92 The bid-
der must file a tender-offer statement with the Comptroller'93 and
observe certain substantive requirements, including:
(1) pro rata acceptance of shares tendered within ten days of the
offer if the offer is for less than all outstanding shares;
(2) nonvariance of the offer during the term of the offer without
giving all offerees the benefit of the most favorable offer;
(3) withdrawal rights of tendering shareholders for fifteen days
after the commencement of the offer; and
(4) certain minimum disclosures that must be made to target com-
pany shareholders.
194
Also, the target bank must file, no later than ten business days from
the date the tender-offer is commenced, a Solicitation/Recommenda-
tion Statement pursuant to Exchange Act section 14(d)(4)'9 which ex-
188. See infra note 190 and the discussion of Exchange Act §§ 14(c) for the importance of the
information statement required to be furnished even if management is not soliciting proxies.
189. See also Form F-6.
190. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(c) (1982).
191. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1982).
192. 12 C.F.R. §§ 11.5(1) (1983). See also 12 C.F.R. § 11.5(o) (1983), which contains regula-
tions relating to tender-offers for shares in national banks not covered by the Exchange Act. The
requirements contained in that section include prohibitions against: (1) holding the tender-offer
open less than twenty days; (2) increasing the offered consideration without extending the offer-
ing period at least ten days; (3) failing to pay the consideration offered; and (4) extending the
length of the tender-offer without issuing a press release containing that information.
193. Form F-13, 12 C.F.R. § 11.54 (1983).
194. Effective Dec. 15, 1982, the Commission by rule expanded the provisions of Exchange
Act § 14(d)(6) to provide for pro rata acceptance of shares tendered at any time during the offer.
Exchange Act Release No. 34-19336. 47 Fed. Reg. 57,679 (Dec. 15, 1982), now contained in rule
14d-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14D-8 (1983). The Commission had previously expanded the withdrawal
rights of tendering shareholders from seven to fifteen days beyond the commencement of the
offer. See rule 14d-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7 (1983). The latter rule was also adopted by the
Comptroller. 12 C.F.R. § 11.5(n) (1983).
195. 15'U.S.C. § 78n(d)(4) (1982).
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presses the views of management toward the tender-offer.9 6 Section
14(f) of the Exchange Act' 97 provides that if a majority of the board of
directors of a target company (tender-offer target) has been pre-chosen
by the offeror, then the information required in proxy solicitations for
election to the board of directors must be furnished to the share-
holders.
Section 16 of the Exchange Act' 98 requires persons who acquire 10%
or more of the outstanding equity securities of any class registered
under the Exchange Act, and every officer and director, to file an
Initial Statement of Beneficial Ownership.'99 Any changes in that
person's ownership must be disclosed on a Statement for Changes of
Beneficial Ownership.2 0 In addition, short swing profits and short
selling by 10% security holders and officers and directors is
prohibited.20'
Conspicuously absent from the list of enumerated sections over
which the banking regulators, including the Comptroller, have
authority to administer and enforce are Exchange Act sections 10(b)20 2
and 14(e)20 3 (the antifraud provisions). The text of section 12(i)204 does
not indicate what "powers, functions, and duties" are vested in the
banking regulators, although a literal reading of the language would
seem to exclude authority to enforce the antifraud provisions. That
result may seem anomalous, however, because" if the bank, or any of-
ficer, director, employee, agent, or other person participating in the
conduct of the affairs of the bank, were involved in a 10(b) or 14(e)
violation, the banking regulators would appear to have authority to
enforce those sections indirectly against the bank and certain in-
dividuals or entities through their administrative powers derived from
the National Bank Act.20 5 This section provides authority for the
federal bank regulatory agency to issue a notice of charges, which may
196. Form F-12, 12 C.F.R. § 11.53 (1983). See also 12 C.F.R. §§ 11.5(o)(5), 11.5(n)(1l),
11.5(n)(6) (1983).
197. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(f) (1982).
198. Id. § 78p (1982).
199. Form F-7, 12 C.F.R. § 11.61 (1983). The 10% ownership threshold can also trigger
CBCA filings. See text supra accompanying notes 123-171.
200. Form F-8, 12 C.F.R. § 11.62 (1983).
201. "Short swing profits" result from the purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, of
securities within any period of less than six months. The profits may be recovered by the issuer.
See Exchange Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982). "Short selling" is selling securities that are
not presently owned. Such transactions are profitable only if the market value of the securities
decreases. See Exchange Act § 16(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (1982).
202. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
203. Id. § 78n(c) (1982).
204. Id. § 781(i) (1982).
205. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b) (1982).
[Vol. 36:789
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol36/iss4/3
BANK MERGERS OR TAKEOVERS
lead to the issuance of a cease and desist order after appropriate notice
and hearing, if, for example, in the opinion of the agency
any insured bank.., or any director, officer, employee, agent, or
other person participating in the conduct of the affairs of such a
bank... is violating or has violated, or the agency has reasonable
cause to believe that the bank or any director, officer, employee,
agent, or other person participating in the conduct of the affairs
of such bank is about to violate, a law, rule, or regulation .... 06
Hence, a plain reading of section 1818(b) would appear to grant the
banking regulators the power to redress violations of the antifraud
provisions at least through administrative proceedings.07
Notwithstanding probable jurisdiction under 12 U.S.C. § 1818, the
ability to bring actions under section 12(i) in district court to enjoin
violations of the antifraud provisions appears questionable. In describ-
ing the authority delegated to the banking regulators, the legislative
history of section 12(i) is replete with specific statements that the sec-
tion would delegate to the federal banking regulators powers to admin-
ister and enforce "registration and reporting requirements," "proxy
rules," and "insider trading rules" with respect to securities issued by
banks.08
Consistent with the 1964 legislative history of section 12(i) is the
legislative history amending that section in 1968 with the passage of
the Williams Act.20 9 The reports of the House of Representatives um-
marized the 1968 amendments to section 12(i) as follows:
206. Id.
207. Hearings on H.R. 6789, H.R. 6793, S. 1642, Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and
Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess.
(1963-64) ("House Hearings"), reprinted in HOUSE INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE COMM.,
INVESTOR PROTECTION (1963), at 6, 15 (Statement of William L. Cary, Chairman, Securities and
Exchange Comm'n), at 31; (Letter from William L. Cary to Hon. Oren Harris), at 72, 79;
(Statement of William L. Cary), at 56; (Recommendations of the Special Study of the Securities
Markets that would be implemented by the bill), at 161, 162, 165; (Statement of the Securities
and Exchange Comm'n), at 614; (Statement of Hudson B. Lemkau, vice-chairman, Board of
Governors, NASD), at 1361, 1362-65; (Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange Comm'n),
at 1375; (Letter from the American Bankers Association).
208. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 7693 Before the Committee of the Whole House, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), 110 CONG. REC. 17,914 (1964) (Statement of William L. Cary, Chair-
man, SEC, id. at 17,919-20); id. at 31 (Letter of Chairman Harris from Chairman Perry); id. at
72 (Statement of Chairman Cary); id. at 79; id. at 156 (Recommendations of the Special Study
of the Securities Markets-implemented by the bill); id. at 161 (Statement of the Securities and
Exchange Commission); id. at 162; id. 165; id. at 614 (Statement of Hudson B. Lemkau, vice-
chairman, Board of Governors, NASD); id. at 1361 (Memorandum of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission); id. at 1362-65; id. at 1375 (Letter from the American Bankers
Association.).
209. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 781-78n (1982)).
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Section 12(i) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 would be
amended to make clear that the authority and responsibility to ad-
minister and enforce the new disclosure provisions added to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by this bill [the Williams Act], in-
sofar as they apply to the securities of banks, will be vested in the
various federal banking agencies rather than in the Securities and
Exchange Commission.
This amendment is consistent with the provisions of the
Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, which vested in the Federal
banking agencies the authority and responsibility to administer the
disclosure provisions of the Exchange Act as they apply to bank
securities. Under this section the Federal bank regulatory agencies
are authorized to adopt rules and forms differing from those of
the Securities and Exchange Commission whenever the bank
regulatory agencies deem it appropriate.10
However, an argument can be made that the antifraud provisions con-
stitute a "power" or "function" necessary for the enforcement of the
enumerated sections, i.e., sections 12, 13, 14(a), 14(c), 14(d), 14(f),
and 16 of the Act. In fact, Chairman Cary of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, in his testimony during the 1963 congressional
hearings concerning what came to be the 1964 Securities Acts amend-
ments, testified that the absence of adequate disclosure "deprived in-
vestors of important bulwarks against fraud."'"
Hence, there would appear to be a relationship between the system
of disclosure created by the sections enumerated in section 12(i) and
the antifraud provisions of section 10(b) and 14(e). It may be argued
that the absence of effective authority to enforce prohibitions against
false and misleading statements significantly derogates from the effec-
tiveness of any system of disclosure. Indeed, this principle is reflected
in the SEC's criticism of the disclosure requirements the Comptroller
had at that time already adopted under its general authority. In his
prepared testimony before the House subcommittee, Chairman Cary
stated:
210. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2811, 2817 (emphasis added). See also S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975)
reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 179, 229, which accompanied Pub. L. No.
94-29, 89 Stat. 117 (1975) (the 1975 Securities Act Amendments) wherein Congress considered
the "contrasting regulatory philosophies and orientations of the banking and securities statutes,
and the public policies which underlie each" before reaffirming the Commission's "plenary
power" in the area of fraud even over bank municipal dealer activities.
211. Memorandum of Securities and Exchange Commission with respect to changes in H.R.
6789 between its submission to the industry liaison committee and its introduction in Congress.
House Hearings, supra note 207, at 75. See also Hearings on S. 1642 Before the Senate Comm.
on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 288 (1963).
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There have been recent efforts on the part of the Comptroller of
the Currency to provide by annual reporting and proxy rules,
some protections for bank investors . . . . The regulations do fall
below those contemplated by the Exchange Act. For example,
they do not provide for their distribution, contain no general pro-
hibition of the use of false or misleading information, and specifi-
cally deny the right of shareholders to secure relief against false or
misleading solicitations. Thus, useful administrative practices,
along the lines developed by the Commission for assisting com-
panies to transmit properly prepared proxy materials, are not
available-nor are effective private sanctions.
212
If the absence of adequate antifraud provisions is a critical inadequacy
in a system of disclosure, as the above quotation would imply, then a
strong argument can be made that the authority to enforce and ad-
minister the enumerated provisions also includes the authority to en-
force sections 10(b) and 14(e) as "necessary for the administration and
enforcement of sections 12, 13, 14a, 14c, 14d, 14f, and 16. " 113
Because of the interplay of statutes and regulations applicable to
national bank mergers, to consolidations, and to tender-offers, e.g.,
the National Bank Act, the Exchange Act, the Securities Act, the Bank
Holding Act, the Bank Merger Act, and the Change in Bank Control
Act, certain inconsistencies have developed that often make it difficult
or impossible to comply with all applicable regulations. For example,
the National Bank Act, in both its merger2'1 4 and consolidation sec-
tions,2t5 provides extensive requirements to protect shareholders who
dissent from the proposed reorganization. It provides that the receiv-
ing association shares that would have gone to the dissenting share-
holder had he not dissented shall be sold at an advertised public auc-
tion. The dissenting shareholder is entitled to receive the amount by
which the auction price exceeds the appraised value of his shares.216
212. House Hearings, supra note 207, at 118.
213. Section 12(i) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781(i) (1982). There is, however, a district
court decision, in a suit brought by a state chartered bank seeking to quash an SEC subpoena in
an investigation involving alleged § 10(b) violations, in which the following is stated, en dictum:
"The sole governmental agency charged with enforcing the antifraud sections [of the Exchange
Act] against the banks is the SEC. Although federal banking officials hold concurrent jurisdic-
tion to enforce some of the securities laws, they can not enforce these antifraud sections."
Peoples Bank v. William, 449 F. Supp. 254, 260 (W.D. W. Va. 1978).
214. 12 U.S.C. § 215a (1982).
215. Id. § 215 (1982).
216. For purposes of the discussion relating to dissenter's rights, there is no practical distinc-
tion between a merger governed by 12 U.S.C. § 215a (1982) and a consolidation governed by 12
12 U.S.C. § 215 (1982). Ellis v. State Nat'l Bank, 434 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1978). (12 U.S.C.
§§ 215 and 215a (1982) will hereafter be referred to as "merger statutes"). The merger statutes
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Because of the detailed and somewhat cumbersome procedures that
must be followed to value the dissenting shareholders' shares, a signifi-
cant time can elapse between the shareholders' meeting called to con-
sider the merger or consolidation and the advertised public auction of
the shares, which is the last step in the valuation process. The share-
holders have a right to have three appraisers appointed, to have an ap-
praisal done of the value of the shares and, if the appraisal is unaccep-
table, to appeal it to the Comptroller, who will then conduct a reap-
praisal. After that reappraisal, the shares are sold at a public auction
with the dissenting shareholders receiving any amount over and above
the Comptroller's appraised value.1 7 That delay can be used by dis-
senting shareholders to extract a premium price from the surviving in-
stitution.
When enacted in 1959,218 the merger statutes envisioned bank-to-
bank mergers and consolidations. Little or no consideration was given
to the possibility of significant bank holding company acquisitions. A
bank holding company, in order to effect a merger or consolidation in
all but cash purchase agreements, must have filed a registration state-
ment with the Commission pursuant to the Securities Act.2 19 That
registration statement is usually filed on forms S-14 or S-15, (short-
form registration statements), which are wraparound proxy statements
submitted to the national bank shareholders. The S-14 or S-15 then
serves as the proxy statement220 and registration statement for effect-
ing the merger between the national bank and the holding company.
The Comptroller has, as an unwritten policy, interpreted the statute
to mean that it is the holding company shares that must be auctioned
pursuant to the merger statutes.2 ' Because of the delay in the ap-
praisal rights, many times the registration statement of the holding
company is no longer effective when the appraisal process reaches the
auction stage. The holding company is then faced with having to file a
new registration statement (or to amend its previously filed statement
with current information) prior to the public auction, at additional ex-
contemplate that the surviving institution will be a national bank. If the survivor is a state bank,
12 U.S.C. § 214a (1982) applies.
217. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 215(c), (d); 215a(c), (d) (1982).
218. Pub. L. No. 86-230, 73 Stat. 460 (1959). See 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2232.
219. Bank acquisitions by holding companies effected under the merger statues, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 215, 215a (1982), except those involving a purchase and assumption (i.e., the purchase of
assets for cash with the attendant assumption of liabilities), usually involve the distribution of
holding company securities to the acquired bank's shareholders. Bank holding companies do not
qualify for the exemption from registration found in section 3(a)(2) of the Securities Act, 15
U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1982).
220. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 11.5, 11.51 (1983).
221. Golden, Corporate Law for Financial Institutions, 99 BANKING L.J., 745, 749 (1982).
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pense, pay the dissenting shareholders a premium to waive their right
to an auction under the merger statute, or seek to qualify for an ex-
emption from the registration requirements.
The most common such exemption sought to be utilized by holding
company counsel is the intrastate-offering exemption under section
3(a)(11) of the Securities Act.222 The question then arises whether an
auction limited to bidders of one state is a "public auction" within the
meaning of the merger statutes. The Comptroller has taken the posi-
tion that such intrastate auctions may qualify as "public auctions" in
certain situations. The factors considered include the size of the bank,
its location within the state, and the size of potential bidders. In addi-
tion, the Comptroller considers the number of shares to be auctioned
and the nature of the market for those shares.
223
There is yet another way by which holding company counsel have
recently sought to avoid the difficulties imposed by the interplay
between the Securities Act and the merger statutes. A reading of the
merger statutes clearly indicates that it is only the dissenting
shareholders in the disappearing institution who have the protections
previously outlined. This reading is consistent with the legislative
history contained in the House and Senate Banking and Currency
Committee Report analyzing the then proposed legislation:
Your committee ... believes that it is desirable that there be made
available a method whereby national banks may combine with
other national banks, and State banks may combine with national
banks under Federal charter, without a right in dissenting
shareholders of the absorbing bank to demand cash payment for
shares. This would achieve that desirable end by authorizing a
new method of merger, one feature of which would be that only
the dissenting shareholders of the absorbed bank would be
entitled to demand cash for their shares.
224
This congressional committee, however, did not anticipate the cor-
porate reorganization method now known as a "reverse triangular
merger" utilizing a phantom or interim bank. A "triangular merger"
is a statutory merger under applicable state or federal law in which the
consideration for the merger is stock, securities, or other property of
the controlling parent of one of the merging corporations. If the cor-
222. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1982).
223. See Letter from Frederick R. Medero, Director, Securities Disclosure Division, Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency (Sept. 21, 1978), and Letter from Peter C. Liebesman, Senior
Attorney, Legal Advisory Services Division, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (Sept.
18, 1978).
224. H.R. REP. No. 2421, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2133, 2134. See also S. REP. No. 763, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1951).
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poration to be acquired merges into the controlled subsidiary, the
transaction is known as a "triangular merger." If, on the other hand,
the controlled subsidiary merges into the target corporation, the trans-
action is known as a "reverse triangular merger." In any event, the
surviving corporation remains or becomes a subsidiary of the parent
corporation that supplied the consideration for the merger. In the con-
text of a bank holding company acquisition, the controlled subsidiary
of the bank holding company, which is a party to the merger, may be
an operating bank subsidiary of the holding company or a nonoper-
ating "interim bank," chartered for the purpose of the merger."'
Historically, the primary business advantage of casting a bank ac-
quisition in the form of a triangular merger was that (subject to
dissenters' rights) the holding company would obtain all of the
outstanding shares of the target bank.2 6 By virtue of the National
Bank Act and the Comptroller's interpretation of the merger statutes
requiring a public auction of holding company shares pursuant to the
dissenters' rights provisions, the reverse triangular merger has received
increased attention.
A reverse triangular merger is one in which the interim bank, set up
by the holding company, is merged into the existing (target) bank.
That latter bank becomes the surviving institution. The shareholders
would be paid cash or a mixture of cash and stock to give up their
equity interests. Each share of the phantom bank (which would be
wholly owned by the bank holding company) would then be converted
into the target bank shares so that the bank holding company would
become the sole shareholder of the target bank. 7 Thus, while the
target bank would be the resulting or surviving association, its share-
holders' interests would be replaced by ownership interests in the bank
holding company that set up the phantom. The target bank then sur-
vives in the merger transaction and, as noted in the legislative history
to the merger statutes, Congress did not intend for shareholders in sur-
viving institutions to have dissenters' rights.2 28
The Comptroller, because of the lack of dissenters' rights in a
225. On March 13, 1981, the Comptroller adopted new rules applicable to the formation of
interim national banks (see 46 Fed. Reg. 16,661 (1981)). An "interim national bank" is generally
defined in the rules as a new national bank organized solely to facilitate the creation of a bank
holding company and the acquisition of 100% of the voting shares of an existing bank, which
prior to commencing business will be a party to a merger with an existing bank. 46 Fed. Reg.
16,662 (1981), codified in 12 C.F.R. § 5.21(a) (1983). The rules were intended to eliminate un-
necessary duplication and delay in charter applications filed solely to facilitate such transactions.
226. J. CHAMBERS & L. SADLER, JR., BANK HOLDING COMPANIES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
BANK ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS ch. 3 (1982).
227. See 12 U.S.C. § 72 (1982).
228. See Golden, supra note 221.
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reverse triangular merger, has historically denied applications for such
reorganizations.229 Therefore, their current viability, at least as to
national bank acquisitions and reorganizations, is minimal.
Conclusion
The comparatively comfortable environment that existed as recently
as ten years ago, with clear lines between investment and commercial
banking, and safe interstate havens for the latter, is no longer with us.
Commercial banks compete with money market funds through the
Money Market Deposit Accounts and SuperNow Accounts, author-
ized effective November 15, 1982 and January 5, 1983, respectively.
Banks and bank holding companies have expanded their products and
services as discount brokers and as futures commission merchants.
Securities firms are attempting to buy banks and "nonbanks" and
offer bank-like services interstate. As the assaults on the Glass-Steagall
Act and interstate banking prohibitions continue, it would appear wise
to consider the events that led originally to their imposition. Can we
now say that the financial markets are sophisticated and "mature"
enough to avoid another crash? As banks become less regulated and
are allowed to pay more for their source funds, they may be forced to
take more risks in order to generate a competitive return.
The high degree of regulation in the banking industry has provided
obstacles to geographic- and product-extending activities within the
banking industry. That same regulation has also protected the industry
from competition and hindered a concentration of capital. With the
advent of deregulation the banking industry faces competition both
from within and beyond its historical confines. While such competi-
tion may ultimately strengthen the industry, it will no doubt exact a
price. Whether the price, which includes risks of failure, is justified re-
mains to be seen.
229. The Comptroller's authority to "approve" mergers carries with it a great degree of
discretion. As stated by the court in Apfel v. Mellon, 33 F.2d 805, 807 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
280 U.S. 585 (1929), "An examination of congressional egislation with regard to banking since
1864 shows that Congress has consistently used various forms of the word 'approved' in the
sense of conferring discretion upon the Comptroller of the Currency, the Secretary of the
Treasury, or the Federal Reserve Board."
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